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ABSTRACT
A Risk-Averse Newsvendor Model
with Pricing Consideration
by
YE Zuobin
Master of Philosophy
A decision maker who is facing a random demand for a perishable product, such
as newspapers, decides how many units to order for a single selling period. This
single-period inventory problem is often referred to as the “classic newsvendor
problem”, in which the selling price is fixed, the order must be made before
the selling period, and the decision maker is risk-neutral. If the decision maker
orders too many (overage), the inventory cost will be too high. If the decision
maker orders too few (underage), the potential profit will be lost. The optimal
order quantity is a balance between the expected costs of overage and underage.
This thesis investigates an extension of the classic newsvendor problem. In this
extension the demand depends on the selling price, the decision maker may
obtain an additional order at a higher price during the selling period, and the
decision maker is risk-averse (not risk-neutral). The problem is to find optimal
order quantity and selling price so that the expected utility of the risk-averse
decision maker is maximized.
This thesis examines the relationship between the order quantity and the sell-
ing price for different risk-averse decision makers in this extended newsvendor
problem defined above. The result shows that the relationships are consistent
for some decision makers but not for others. For example, if the decision maker
exhibits a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), the optimal order quantity
will decline when the selling price increases. If the decision maker has constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA), the relationship is complex. This thesis finds
that if it is just known that the decision maker is risk-averse, the optimal order
quantity placed is less than that made by a risk-neutral decision maker. Further
more, the risk-averse decision maker’s optimal order quantity falls when her/his
risk aversion increases. However, the relationship between order quantity and
selling price is still indeterminate in this case.
This extension of the classic newsvendor problem provides a more realistic dy-
namic setting than before, therefore providing an excellent framework for exam-
ining how the inventory problem interacting with the marketing issue (selling
price) will influence decision makers at the firm level. It also provides an inte-
grated framework for investigating different variations of newsvendor problems.
Thus, this thesis will motivate and encourage more applications of the newsven-
dor problem which is a foundation of many supply chain management problems.
I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and
I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have
been duly acknowledged.
(YE Zuobin)
September 2004
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1 Introduction
The classic newsvendor model considers a type of problem that many deci-
sion makers (newsvendors) encounter in the business world. Facing uncertain
demands for limited-useful-life products (such as mobile phones, fashionable
goods etc.), a decision maker (newsvendor) needs to decide how many units of
these goods to order for a single selling period. Intuitively, if she/he orders too
many (overage), this may cause unnecessary inventory cost. The unsold items
have to be salvaged at low prices (generally less than order prices), or just to
be thrown away (the salvaged prices are equal to 0). Thus, the cost will be too
high. Whereas, if the decision maker (newsvendor) orders too few (underage),
it will miss opportunities for additional profits because some customers have no
chance to buy the goods. The optimal solution to this problem is characterized
by a balance between the expected costs of overage and underage.
This classic inventory problem includes four assumptions: the uncertain demand
is price-independent, the only decision for the decision maker (newsvendor) is
the order quantity, the decision maker (newsvendor) is allowed to place the order
only once in the whole selling season, and the decision made is based on the
expected monetary value criterion. However, by considering the following issues,
this thesis extends the classic newsvendor problem to include more satisfactory
aspects.
First, a price-dependent demand might be considered. It is common sense that
the selling price affects a consumer’s willingness to buy. The higher the selling
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price, the lower the willingness to buy. On the other hand, when the selling price
is set lower, the willingness increases. Therefore, the sellers generally face price-
dependent demands for their goods. The higher the selling price of a product
is, the lower the demand is, and vice-versa. That is the reason why discount
strategies are often used when sellers promote their goods. The phenomenon
that demand depends on selling price has been discussed in many economics
books. Economists use the Demand Curve to describe this relationship (Such
as Stiglitz and Walsh, 2002). This thesis investigates how selling price affects
order quantity if a price-dependent demand is considered in the newsvendor
problem.
Second, in addition to determining the order quantity of materials, the decision
maker (newsvendor) might consider the selling price. In the situation where a
delay in production exists, the producer faces uncertain selling prices. At the
time of production, the producer knows with certainty the costs that must be
incurred and the production that will result. However, what is unknown is the
selling price at which the product can be sold. As mentioned above, selling price
might affect demand, thus affecting profit. Therefore, selling price must be set
carefully to result in the best income of the producer. This thesis considers
jointly the order quantity and the selling price.
Third, a second order during the selling season might be considered. In some
cases, when the producers launch a new product, such as a new type of mobile
phone, they may have no clear idea about the demand at the beginning of
production. Initially, the producers might produce a certain amount of the
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product according to their estimation. After a certain period, the producers
might adjust their production according to the data collected from the market.
In this situation, the producers have clearer information about the demand.
If the demand exceeds the initial production, the producers might want to
produce more. In contrast, the producers might want to produce less. For
example, one of the telecommunication manufacturers in mainland China, Z.X.
Telecommunication Equipment Co., Ltd., always takes such a strategy when it
launches a new mobile phone. When the demand exceeds the initial order in
the selling season, not only may the producers have to replenish their materials
for production, but also the distributors may have to replenish the goods to sell.
Generally, the initial order must be sent before the level of demand is revealed. If
the replenishment is allowed, both the producers and the distributors may have
more accurate demand information when the replenishment is needed. Thus,
some costs may be eliminated. This thesis examines how selling price affects
order quantity in a two-order scenario.
Finally, decision makers might use the expected utility criterion instead of the
expected monetary value criterion. According to the expected-utility hypoth-
esis, which is the standard paradigm for analyzing economic behavior under
uncertainty, this thesis aims to examine the newsvendor problem for a different
point of view and to see if different results exist. Some interesting results are
listed in later sections of this thesis.
If this thesis can address these issues by considering a situation with a price-
dependent demand, two decision variables (order quantity and selling price), and
3
allowing replenishment when necessary, then the classic newsvendor model can
be refined. The following extension model of the classic newsvendor problem is
proposed. The newsvendor, who has initial wealth of w0, orders product at unit
cost c. The newsvendor sells the product at unit price p. All unsold product
can be salvaged for unit price s < c. And the newsvendor is allowed to replenish
the product if demand exceeds the initial order quantity, but at a higher unit
price cˆ > c. A natural assumption is that 0 ≤ s < c < cˆ ≤ p. Demand is
random price-dependent, and is defined as D˜(p, ²˜) = a− bp + ²˜ (a > 0, b > 0),
where a−bp is a decreasing function of p that captures the dependency between
demand and price, ²˜ is a random variable that shows randomness in demand
and is price-independent. The newsvendor considers jointly order quantity and
selling price to maximize the expected utility of profit.
In the proposed setting, the newsvendor is allowed to place a second order when
the demand exceeds the initial order. Although the higher second order cost
may raise the cost for the newsvendor, we can see if p− cˆ is greater than cˆ− c,
the newsvendor would gain positive profit, thus she/he might want to replenish
when necessary.
The key contribution lies in the fact that this thesis extends the newsvendor
model closer to real life than before. Thus the results may have more significance
in the real business world. As demonstrated in the literature review (next
section), this problem and the proposed extension have not been discussed in
previous studies.
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In the third section, the theoretical framework will be introduced. The extension
of the classic newsvendor model is proposed in section 4. Section 5 will analyze
the effect of change in selling price on the optimal order quantity. Finally, the
conclusion is drawn in section 6.
2 Literature Review
The newsvendor problem has a rich history that goes back to the economist
Edgeworth (1888), who applied a variant to a bank cash-flow problem. However,
it was not until the 1950s that this problem, like many other OR/MS models
seeded by the war effort, became a topic of serious and extensive academic
study. This simple problem, with its intuitively appealing optimal solution, is
a crucial building block of many stochastic inventory problems.
Porteus (1990) provides an excellent review of the newsvendor problem. Typi-
cally, the focus of this extensive literature is on operational efficiency to minimize
expected cost. Demand or market parameters often are taken to be exogenous.
Whitin (1955) was the first to formulate a newsvendor model with price effects.
In his model, selling price and order quantity are set simultaneously. Whitin
adapted the newsvendor model to include a probability distribution of demand
that depends on the unit selling price, where price is a decision variable rather
than an external parameter. He assumed that the expected demand is a function
of price and using incremental analysis, derived the necessary optimality condi-
tion. Whitin then provided closed-form expressions for the optimal price, which
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is used to find the optimal order quantity for a demand with a uniform distribu-
tion. He established a sequential procedure for determining the optimal order
quantity as a function of selling price first and then the corresponding optimal
selling price. Mills (1959; 1962) refined the formulation by explicitly specifying
mean demand as a function of the selling price. He assumed demand to be a
random variable with an expected value that is decreasing in price and with
constant variance. Mills derived the necessary optimality conditions and pro-
vided further analysis for the case of demand with uniform distribution. Unlike
the version of the newsvendor problem in which selling price is exogenous, this
more strategic variant has received limited attention since the 1950s. Khouja
(1999) builds a taxonomy of the newsvendor problem literature and delineates
the contribution of the different extensions of the newsvendor problem. He also
suggests some future directions for research in the newsvendor problem.
Petruzzi and Dada (1999) apply the newsvendor framework to analyze a firm
that sets a selling price and order quantity prior to facing random demand in a
single period. In their paper they examine an extension of the newsvendor model
(PD model) in which order quantity and selling price are set simultaneously.
Petruzzi and Dada validate Zabel’s (1970) method of first optimizing selling
price for a given order quantity, and then searching over the resulting optimal
trajectory to maximize the expected profit. Through this method, they find the
optimal order quantity and the optimal selling price for a risk-neutral newsven-
dor. However, they just consider the situation where the demand exceeds the
initial order, the newsvendor would be asked to pay the penalty, instead of al-
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lowing replenishment when shortage comes. Moreover, they just consider the
case for a risk-neutral newsvendor, but not for a risk-averse newsvendor.
Lau and Lau (1988) introduced a model in which the newsvendor has the option
of decreasing price in order to increase demand. The authors analyzed two cases
for demand. Case A: A normally distributed demand with an expected value
which decreases linearly with unit selling price. Case B: Demand distribution
is constructed using a combination of statistical data analysis and experts’ sub-
jective estimates. For case A, the authors showed that the expected profit is
unimodal and thus the golden section method can be used for maximization. For
case B, there is no guarantee that the expected profit is unimodal. Thus, Lau
and Lau developed a search procedure for identifying local maximums. They
also solved the problem under the objective of maximizing the probability of
achieving a target profit and considered both zero and positive shortage cost
cases. For zero shortage cost and demand given by case A, the authors derived
closed-form solutions for the optimal order quantity and optimal price. For zero
shortage cost and demand given by case B, the authors developed a procedure
for computing the probability of achieving a target profit and used a search
procedure for finding a good solution. For positive shortage cost and demand
given by case A or B, the probability of achieving a target profit may not be
unimodal. Lau and Lau developed procedures for computing the probability
of achieving a target profit and identifying a good solution. However, similar
to the work of Petruzzi and Dada (1999), the authors do not consider a situ-
ation where replenishment is allowed when demand exceeds the initial order.
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Also, they just consider the case for a risk-neutral newsvendor, but not for a
risk-averse newsvendor.
Although much has been written about the newsvendor problem, relatively little
has been done about the risk-averse newsvendor. It seems to be well known
that risk aversion leads to a reduced initial order quantity. Unfortunately, only
a scattering of other results can be found, and usually within very specific
models. Horowitz (1970) for example, has examined a risk-averse newsvendor
for specific utility functions.
An early paper looking at more general risk-averse preferences is by Baron
(1973). Baron examines the comparative-static effects of changes in newsven-
dor risk aversion and changes in the salvage value of unsold newspaper on the
optimal order quantity. Baron does not consider the newsvendor problem in-
trinsically, but his short section on piecewise-linear payoff functions can be
interpreted to yield the above-mentioned analysis. Britney and Winkler (1974)
and Lau (1980) also examine the optimal order for a risk-averse newsvendor,
but for particular utility functions and in conjunction with particular demand
distributions. Bouakiz and Sobel (1992) also examine the optimal stock policy
for an exponential utility function.
Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1995) consider the newsvendor problem un-
der various risk-averse preferences. In their model (EGS model), the newsven-
dor (i.e. decision maker) is allowed to obtain additional newspapers if demand
exceeds his original order quantity at a higher cost. Based on this model
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they examine the effects of risk and risk aversion in the newsvendor problem.
Comparative-static effects of changes in the various price and cost parameters
are determined and related to the newsvendor’s risk aversion. The addition of a
random background wealth and of an increase in the riskiness of newspaper de-
mand are also examined. However, the analysis in this paper shows that many
of the comparative effects generally are ambiguous, only some fairly simple re-
strictions on preferences and/or risk increases are shown to lead to qualitatively
deterministic results. And, their model considers a price-independent demand
only. If this thesis can address this gap by considering a situation with a price-
dependent demand, the EGS model can be refined.
The purpose of this study is to extend the newsvendor model by combining the
PD model and the EGS model, to find some deterministic results, which are
different from existing results.
3 Theoretical Framework
This thesis investigates an extension of the classic newsvendor problem by us-
ing the theory of Risk Aversion. Before going ahead, the classic Newsvendor
Problem and the Theory of Risk Aversion are briefly introduced in this section.
3.1 The Newsvendor Problem
Let us illustrate this classic inventory problem with a newsvendor who is selling
newspapers every morning. Suppose the newsvendor sells newspapers at a unit
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price of $1.00, after picking up the newspapers that morning at 70 cents for each.
There is uncertainty in how many people will buy a newspaper. Assume that if
the newsvendor has any leftover newspaper, she/he sells them at a discount, at
20 cents each. This leads to a cost of overage of 50 cents each. If the newsvendor
fails to have enough newspapers one morning, a customer who expects to buy
one that day, but couldn’t because the newsvendor ran out, may decide to take
a different route to office from then on, to insure that she/he is able to buy the
newspaper she/he wants the second day. Thus, the newsvendor has lost not only
that day’s sale, but has also lost some potential future profit. In other words,
when the newsvendor under-buy on the number of newspapers, she/he may
lose more than the immediate profit. Thus, the newsvendor faces the problem
that how many newspapers she/he should order every morning to maximize the
profit. This is referred as the classic newsvendor problem.
Intuitively, this classic single-period inventory problem considers the following
dilemma. The decision maker (newsvendor) facing random demand for a perish-
able product, such as newspaper, decides how many units to order for a single
selling period. If the decision maker (newsvendor) orders too many (overage),
the cost will be unnecessarily too high; whereas, if the decision maker (newsven-
dor) orders too few (underage), it will miss opportunities for additional profits.
The optimal solution to this problem is characterized by a balance between the
expected costs of overage and underage.
The newsvendor problem applies in a wide array of settings. For example, fash-
ion apparel retailers often must submit orders well in advance of a selling season
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without any opportunity for submitting any other orders during the season. A
manufacturer might need to choose its capacity (i.e., its order quantity) before
the launch of a new product, knowing that the new product will become ob-
solete quickly (e.g., computers or mobile phones). Special promotions usually
present a similar problem: order too little and the retailer faces irate customers,
but order too much and the retailer incurs additional inventory holding costs
as it slowly sells the excess inventory. The newsvendor model also applies to
individual choice problems, such as health care financing and insurance pur-
chasing (Rosenfield, 1986; Anvari, 1987; Chung, 1990; Eeckhoudt, Gollier and
Schlesinger, 1991).
3.2 The Theory of Risk-Aversion
This section introduces the Theory of Risk-Aversion. Before the introduction,
some terms and notations are defined as follows.
w: Wealth of a decision maker (newsvendor) which is a random variable over
R = (−∞,+∞). For simplicity, this thesis takes wealth to be a sin-
gle commodity and disregards the difficulties of aggregation over many
commodities. For most purposes, w is taken to be the money value of
commodity holdings (including holdings of money itself) at market prices.
There is no loss of generality under perfect competition as long as prices
remain constant.
w0: The initial wealth of a decision maker (newsvendor).
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u(w): The total utility of wealth w. This thesis assumes that the utility of
wealth is a differentiable function, indeed, twice differentiable. Economists
refer to the benefits of consumption as the utility that decision makers
(newsvendors) obtain from the combination of goods they consume. A
simply way to measure utility will suffice: We ask how much a decision
maker (newsvendor) would be willing to pay to be in one situation rather
than another. Willingness to pay is a useful measure of utility, which is of-
ten helpful when considering how a decision maker (newsvendor) allocates
her/his profit along her/his budget constraint.
u′(w): Marginal utility of wealth w. We can always assume that wealth is
desirable, thus, u′(w) > 0 in general. So, u(w) is a strictly increasing
function of w.
u′′(w): The rate of change of marginal utility with respect to wealth w.
Concavity is a geometric term which describes a curve. In mathematics, a
function f(x) is said to be concave on an interval [a, b], if, for all x, y in
[a, b], f(
x+ y
2
) ≥ f(x) + f(y)
2
.
From the time of Bernoulli (1738), risk aversion has been associated with con-
cavity of utility functions. After the axiomatization of the expected utility
hypothesis by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944), economists
immediately began to see the potential applications of expected utility to eco-
nomic issues like portfolio choice, insurance, etc. It was not until Pratt (1964)
and Arrow (1965) that it was recognized that the Arrow-Pratt measures of ab-
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solute and relative risk aversion are excellent measures of the strength of risk
aversion. Subsequently, the Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute and relative risk
aversion have often demonstrated their usefulness in a wide range of both the-
oretical and empirical studies of behavior under uncertainty.
3.2.1 Risk Aversion, Neutrality and Loving
Figure 1: Risk-Aversion and Certainty Equivalence
Suppose w can take on two values, {w1, w2}, and let p1 be the probability
that w1 happens and (1 − p1) the probability that w2 happens. Consequently,
expected outcome, or E(w) = p1w1 + (1 − p1)w2 which is shown in Figure 1
on the horizontal axis as the convex combination of w1 and w2. Suppose u(w)
is the utility function depicted in Figure 1 as concave. Thus, expected utility
E(u) = p1u(w1) + (1− p1)u(w2), as shown in Figure 1 by point E on the chord
connecting A = {w1, u(w1)} and B = {w2, u(w2)}. The position of E on the
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chord depends, of course, on the probabilities p1 and (1− p1).
Notice by comparing points D and E in Figure 1 that the concavity of the
utility function implies that the utility of expected income, u[E(w)] is greater
than expected utility E(u), i.e. u[p1w1+(1− p1)w2] > p1u(w1)+ (1− p1)u(w2).
This represents the utility-decreasing aspects of pure risk-bearing.
As is obvious from Figure 1, we introduce Cu(w) with certainty, which is equal
to the expected utility of the random prospect, i.e. u(Cu(z)) = E(u). In
this term, the superscript “u” of C reminds us that the value of the certainty-
equivalent lottery depends on the form of the utility function. However, notice
that the income Cu(w) is less than the expected income, i.e Cu(w) < E(w).
Yet we know that a decision maker (newsvendor) would be indifferent between
receiving Cu(w) with certainty and E(w) with uncertainty. Thus, we can define
the risk-premium below.
Risk-premium: is denoted by piu(w) = E(w)−Cu(w). This difference is equal
to the maximum amount of income that an agent is willing to forego in
order to obtain an allocation without risk (Pratt, 1964).
Turning to generalities, as described in Pratt’s paper (1964), if a decision maker
(newsvendor), who has initial wealth w0, faces risk z, the risk-premium can be
presented as follows under utility function u(w).
piu(w, z) = w0 + E(z)− u−1[Eu(w + z)].
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We have the following definitions:
Risk-Aversion: A decision maker (newsvendor) is “risk-averse” if risk-
premium piu(w, z) > 0. Risk-Aversion, intuitively, implies that when
facing choices with comparable returns, decision makers (newsvendors)
tend to choose the less-risky alternative, a construction we owe largely to
Milton Friedman and Leonard J. Savage (1948). Obviously, the greater
piu(w, z) is, the more Risk-Aversion is.
Risk-Neutrality: A decision maker (newsvendor) is “risk-neutral” if risk-
premium piu(w, z) = 0 for all random variables.
Risk-Loving: A decision maker (newsvendor) is a “risk-lover” if risk-premium
piu(w, z) < 0 for all random variables. Similarly, the less piu(w, z) is, the
more Risk-loving the decision maker is.
Now, we have appealed to the ideas of concave, linear and convex utility func-
tions to represent risk-aversion, risk-neutrality and risk-loving. We might be
impressed in this aspect by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Let u : R 7→ R be an utility function representing preference ºu
for all random variables and u is monotonically increasing. Then:
(i) u is concave if and only if ºu displays risk-aversion.
(ii) u is convex if and only if ºu display risk-proclivity.
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(iii) u is linear if and only if ºu is risk-neutral.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.2.2 Arrow-Pratt Measures of Risk-Aversion
How does one measure the “degree” of risk aversion of a decision maker
(newsvendor)? The first instinct may be to appeal immediately to the con-
cavity of the utility functions. However, as utility functions are not unique,
second derivatives of utility functions are not unique, and thus will not serve
to compare the degrees of risk aversion in any pair of utility functions. The
risk premium is expressed in terms of “wealth”, and might be a better magni-
tude. If these can be connected to the “concavity” of utility curves - adjusted
to control for non-uniqueness - so much the better. The most famous measures
of risk-aversion, named the Arrow-Pratt Measures of Absolute Risk-Aversion,
were introduced by John W. Pratt (1964) and Kenneth J. Arrow (1965). We
can note the measure of risk-aversion other than Risk-Premium as follows:
ru(w) = −u
′′(w)
u′(w)
: For a decision maker (newsvendor), if u is monotoni-
cally increasing and strictly concave for the risk-averse decision maker
(newsvendor), then ru(w) > 0. The greater ru(w) is, the more Risk-
Aversion is. ru(w) = 0 for the risk-neutral decision maker (newsvendor)
with a linear utility function and ru(w) < 0 for the risk-loving decision
maker (newsvendor) with a strictly convex utility function. The less ru(w)
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is, the more Risk-loving the decision maker is.
Consider the following theorem due to J.W. Pratt (1964).
Theorem 3.2 (Pratt) Let u, v be two utility functions over wealth which are
continuous, monotonically increasing and twice-differentiable. Then the follow-
ing are equivalent:
(i) ru(x) ≥ rv(x) for every x ∈ R.
(ii) u(x) = T (v(x)) where T is a concave function.
(iii) piu(w) ≥ piv(w) for all random variables.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As we can see, the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion cannot capture
a situation. As in Figure 2, the decision maker (newsvendor) switches from
risk-aversion to risk-loving and then back to risk-aversion. Thus, an alternative
would be to weigh the measure of risk aversion by the level of wealth, w. In
this case another measure, named the Arrow-Pratt Measures of Relative Risk-
Aversion, is introduced as follows:
Ru(w) = wru(w) = −wu
′′(w)
u′(w)
:
At the same time, the following terms are also defined:
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Figure 2: Friedman-Savage Double-Inflection Utility Function (Friedman and
Savage, 1948)
Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA) if r′u(w) < 0. DARA means
that the decision maker (newsvendor) has less risk aversion when it be-
comes wealthier. If absolute risk aversion decreased with wealth, it would
follow that the willingness to engage in small bets of fixed size increases
with wealth. Such a decision maker (newsvendor) might invest a larger
dollar amount in risky assets as her/his wealth grows larger.
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) if r′u(w) = 0. CARA means
that the decision maker (newsvendor) has no change in risk-aversion when
her/his wealth changes.
Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion (IARA) if r′u(w) > 0. IARA means
that the decision maker (newsvendor) has more risk-aversion when she/he
becomes wealthier. In contrast, the decision maker (newsvendor) has less
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risk-aversion when she/he becomes poorer. If absolute risk aversion in-
creased with wealth, it would follow that when a decision maker (newsven-
dor) became wealthier, she/he would actually decrease the amount of risky
assets held. IARA is not supported by everyday observation, so, this thesis
will not discuss the case where the newsvendor has IARA.
Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion (DRRA) if R′u(w) < 0. If a decision
maker (newsvendor) exhibits DRRA, it will invest not only a larger dol-
lar amount, but also a larger fraction of its wealth in risky assets as its
wealth grows larger. As the reason Arrow (1965) states, this preference is
seldom displayed in the real world. DRRA is not supported by everyday
observation, so, this thesis will not discuss the case where the newsvendor
has DRRA.
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) if R′u(w) = 0. CRRA means
that a decision maker (newsvendor) has no change in relative risk-aversion
when its wealth changes.
Increasing Relative Risk Aversion (IRRA) if R′u(w) > 0. IRRA means
that a decision maker (newsvendor) has more relative risk-aversion when
it becomes wealthier. In contrast, it has less relative risk-aversion when
it becomes poorer. IRRA also means that if both wealth and the size of
the risk are increased in the same proportion, the willingness to accept
the risk should decrease.
Let us now consider the following:
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Theorem 3.3 The following three conditions are equivalent:
(i) u(w) displays decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA)
(ii) u(w) = Ta[u(w+a)] is a concave transformation in the level of wealth, where
T ′a > 0 and T
′′
a < 0 for all w and all given a > 0.
(iii) ru(w + a) ≤ ru(w) for all w and a > 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The similar theorems can be applied to CARA and IARA. The proof for them
is analogous and this thesis omit it.
3.2.3 Summary and Examples
According to the discussion above, we summary the Theory of Risk-Aversion in
Table 1.
Table 1: Summary of the Theory of Risk-Aversion
ru > 0 ru = 0 ru < 0
Risk-Aversion
ru Ru Risk- Risk-
r′u > 0 r
′
u = 0 r
′
u < 0 R
′
u > 0 R
′
u = 0 R
′
u < 0 Neutrality Loving
IARA CARA DARA IRRA CRRA DRRA
Let us now consider the following examples to verify the Theory of Risk-Aversion
so as to enhance the understanding of it.
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Figure 3: Utility Function u(w) = w1−r (r = 0.5)
Example 1: Notice that the famous utility function used in the macroeconomic
consumption theory, u(w) =
w1−R
1−R , where R ∈ (0, 1), as described in Figure 3.
Note that
u′(w) = w−R,
u′′(w) = −Rw−R−1,
thus ru(w) =
R
w
> 0, so this decision maker (newsvendor) with such a utility has
absolute risk-aversion. Note that for a fixed R, with the increment of w, ru(w)
declines. This means if the decision maker (newsvendor) becomes wealthier, it
will have less risk-aversion. This also can be seen from
r′u(w) = −
R
w2
< 0 asR ∈ (0, 1), this utility function displays decreasing absolute
risk aversion (DARA). Meanwhile,
Ru(w) = R > 0, thus R
′
u(w) = 0, so this utility function also displays constant
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relative risk-aversion (CRRA). R is the coefficient of relative risk-aversion.
Lemma 3.4 If the utility function u(w) has CRRA, it has the form
u(w) =

c1
1−Rw
1−R, 0 < R < 1, 1 < R,
c2ln(w), R = 1,
where c1, c2 > 0. R is the coefficient of CRRA.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Figure 4: Utility Function u(w) = −e−rw (r = 1)
Example 2: Suppose a utility function, u(w) = −e−rw, where r > 0, as de-
scribed in Figure 4. Note that
u′(w) = re−rw,
u′′(w) = −r2e−rw.
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Thus, ru = r > 0, so this decision maker (newsvendor) has absolute risk-
aversion. Note that r is the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion, the greater r
is, the more risk-aversion is.
r′u = 0, thus this utility function displays constant absolute risk-aversion
(CARA).
Ru = rw, R
′
u = r > 0, so this utility function also displays increasing relative
risk aversion (IRRA).
Lemma 3.5 If the utility function u(w) has CARA, it has the form
u(w) = −c1e−rw,
where r > 0, c1 > 0. r is the coefficient of CARA.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Example 3: Quadratic utility function u(w) = w− rw2, where r > 0, which is
described in Figure 5. Notice that
u′(w) = 1− 2rw,
u′′(w) = −2r.
Thus, ru(w) =
2r
1− 2rw .
For being absolute risk-averse, i.e. ru(w) > 0, we need 1 > 2rw, thus it only
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Figure 5: Utility Function u(w) = w − rw2 (r = 1)
applies for a limited range of w <
1
2r
.
r′u(w) =
4r2
(1− 2rw)2 > 0, where w <
1
2r
. So, this utility function displays
increasing absolute risk-aversion (IARA) when w <
1
2r
.
Ru(w) =
2rw
1− 2rw , R
′
u(w) =
2r
(1− 2rw)2 > 0, for w <
1
2r
. So this utility
function also displays increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA).
Note that, where w >
1
2r
, marginal utility u′(w) = 1 − 2rw is negative - i.e.
beyond this level of wealth, utility declines, and it would be better to throw some
away. Namely, that the willingness to take risks decreases as wealth increases,
i.e. that richer people are more unwilling to take risks. John Hicks (1962)
and Kenneth Arrow (1965) have assaulted the quadratic utility function on this
basis.
A summary of the examples above is shown in Table 2.
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Table 2: Summary of the Examples
u ru Ru r
′
u R
′
u Property
w1−R
1−R , R
w
R − R
w2
0 DARA &
(0 < R < 1) CRRA
− e−rw,
r rw 0 r
CARA &
(r > 0) IRRA
w − rw2,
2r
1− 2rw
2rw
1− 2rw
4r2
(1− 2rw)2
2r
(1− 2rw)2
IARA &(
r > 0 & w <
1
2r
)
IRRA
4 The RAPD model
This section investigates an extension of the classic newsvendor problem, in
which a Risk-Averse newsvendor who faces a Price-Dependent demand (RAPD)
is considered. Thus, this thesis names the extension as the RAPD model here-
after.
4.1 Notations
This thesis defines the following notations.
q: The initial order quantity at the beginning of a single period.
c: The purchasing cost of unit product at the beginning of a single period.
cˆ: The purchasing cost of unit product at late time if the demand exceeds the
initial order quantity q. Usually cˆ > c.
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p: The selling price of unit product. Usually p > cˆ. We would not consider the
case where p = cˆ in this thesis, because this case where p = cˆ means no
re-order is possible equivalently.
s: The unit salvage price for unsold products during the selling season. Usually
0 < s < c.
Price-dependent Demand is defined as D˜(p, ²˜) = a − bp + ²˜ (a > 0, b > 0)
(Mills, 1959), where a− bp is a decreasing function of p that captures the
dependency between demand and selling price. Generally, an increasing
selling price p leads to a decreasing demand. ²˜ is a random variable defined
in the range [−A,B] (A ≥ 0, B ≥ 0) and price-independent. Let F (·)
be the cumulative distribution function of ²˜. Thus, F (−A) = 0 and
F (B) = 1. In order to assure that positive demand is possible for some
range of selling price p, this thesis requires A ≤ a− bp.
4.2 The Description of the RAPD Model
In the PD model (Petruzzi and Dada, 1999), the authors consider a price-setting
firm that faces a random price-dependent demand and determines jointly an
initial order quantity and selling price to maximize the expected profit. After
placing the initial order, the firm cannot re-order if demand exceeds the ini-
tial order and a penalty cost will be charge. They also assume that the firm
(i.e. newsvendor) is risk-neutral and do not analyze this model with other risk
preferences. For details please refer to Table 3 for a summary of the PD model.
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In the EGS model (Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger 1995), the authors il-
lustrate that a newsvendor, with initial wealth w0, buys newspapers at a unit
cost c and sells them at unit price p. All unsold newspapers are returned to
the publisher at unit salvage price s. The newsvendor is allowed to obtain ad-
ditional newspapers when needed at a higher unit cost cˆ. The newsvendor faces
a price-independent demand. However, in this model, only a few comparative
effects can be determined with restrictions. For example, for an increase in the
selling price of a newspaper, the comparative-static analysis is complex. If the
newsvendor is CARA, increasing selling price will lead to a decrease optimal or-
der quantity. Whereas, if the newsvendor prefers to risk aversion or DARA, the
results are still indeterminate. For details please refer to Table 3 for a summary
of the EGS Model.
Based on the literature and reasoning, the new model is raised. Let us consider
such an extension newsvendor model, the RAPD model, which combines the
elements in the PD model and the EGS Model. That is to say, a decision
maker (newsvendor), with initial wealth w0, orders products at unit cost c.
The decision maker (newsvendor) sells the products at unit price p. All unsold
products can be salvaged for s < c. And it is allowed to replenish the products
if demand exceeds the initial order quantity, but at a higher price, cˆ. A natural
assumption is that 0 ≤ s < c < cˆ ≤ p. Demand is random price-dependent.
Randomness in demand is price-independent. The decision maker (newsvendor)
determines jointly an order quantity and selling price to maximize expected
utility of profit. One interpretation of the model is that a single product, such
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as a type of sunglass, is quite popular this summer. The sunglasses have sold
out so fast that the retailer has to re-order the sunglasses. Other retailers also
want to re-order this type of sunglass during the season. This leads to a higher
second order cost for this type of sunglass before the end of this selling season.
The retailers have to decide their initial orders of the sunglass carefully. For
details please refer to Table 3 for a summary of the RAPD model.
In the RAPD model, this thesis considers the situation where the newsvendor
faces price-dependent demand. Thus, the newsvendor will decide more than the
initial order quantity, she/he may also consider selling price at the same time.
That is to say, the model has two decision variables, order quantity and selling
price. This model also considers the situation allowing re-order when the initial
order is less than the demand. When the newsvendor places the second order,
she/he might have more accurate information on the demand than she/he has
at the beginning of the selling season. This helps her/him to save cost. Based
on such a model, this thesis investigates how the selling price will affect the
optimal order quantity under variant risk preferences by using the Theory of
Risk-Aversion.
A comparative summary among the RAPD model, the EGS Model and the PD
model is showed in Table 3.
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Table 3: Comparative Summary among the Models
Factors PD Model EGS Model RAPD model
initial wealth – w0 w0
unit cost c c c
unit re-order cost – cˆ cˆ
unit salvage price s s s
unit penalty cost cp – –
demand a− bp+ ², (b > 0) a+ ² a− bp+ ², (b > 0)
distribution function of ² F (·) F (·) F (·)
density function of ² f(·) f(·) f(·)
utility function – u u
unit selling price p p p
initial order quantity q q q
4.3 Basic Equations
Based on the RAPD model above, at the beginning of the selling season, q units
are ordered at a cost of cq. If the demand during this period does not exceed
q, then the revenue is pD˜ and each of the (q − D˜) leftovers are salvaged at the
unit price s. If the demand exceeds q, then the revenue is pD˜, and each of the
(D˜−q) shortages are replenished at unit cost cˆ > c. The newsvendor, therefore,
is endowed with the following profit function:
Π(p, q, D˜)
4
= pD˜ − cq + smax(0, q − D˜)− cˆmax(0, D˜ − q),
or equivalently,
Π(p, q, D˜) =

Π−(p, q, D˜)
4
= (p− s)D˜ − (c− s)q, D˜ ≤ q,
Π+(p, q, D˜)
4
= (p− cˆ)D˜ + (cˆ− c)q, D˜ > q.
A convenient expression for this profit function is obtained by substituting
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D˜(p, ²˜) = a − bp + ²˜ and, consistent with Ernst (1970) and Thowsen (1975),
defining α = q − (a− bp):
Π(p, α, ²˜) =

Π−(p, α, ²˜)
4
= (p− s)(a− bp+ ²˜)
−(c− s)(a− bp+ α), ²˜ ∈ [−A,α],
Π+(p, α, ²˜)
4
= (p− cˆ)(a− bp+ ²˜)
+(cˆ− c)(a− bp+ α), ²˜ ∈ (α,B].
This transformation of variables provides an alternative interpretation of the
order decision: If the choice of α is greater than the realized value of ²˜, then
overage occurs. If the choice of α is less than the realized value of ²˜, then
underage occurs.
The newsvendor’s objective is to maximize the expected utility of her/his final
wealth w0 + Π, where w0 is the initial wealth, while Π is the profit. That is to
say, the objective is to maximize E[u(w0 + Π)] for u(w0,Π) = u(w0 + Π). The
newsvendor is assumed to be risk-averse and this thesis thus defines u(w0,Π) to
be increasing and concave. For analytical ease, u(w0,Π) also is assumed to be
twice differentiable.
The expected utility of the final wealth w0 + Π for the newsvendor can be
presented as follows:
Hu(p, α)
4
= E[u(w0,Π(p, α, ²))]
=
∫ α
−A
u(w0,Π−(p, α, ²)) dF +
∫ B
α
u(w0,Π+(p, α, ²)) dF. (1)
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To find the maximum of Hu(p, α), this thesis examines that the Hessian for
Hu(p, α), ∇Hu(p, α), is negative definite. Note that other than determining the
optimal order quantity and the optimal selling price to maximize the expected
utility, this thesis examines only the effect of change in selling price p on the
optimal order quantity q = a− bp+α?u(p), where α?u(p) is to maximize Hu(p, α)
for a given p. That is to say,
Hu(p, α
?
u(p)) = maxα Hu(p, α).
Therefore, this thesis omits the calculation of ∇Hu(p, α).
To find α?u(p), this thesis can use the basic calculus method. α
?
u(p) satisfies the
first-order condition of Hu(p, α) is zero.
Specifically consider the first partial derivative of Hu(p, α) taken with respect
to α (by Equation (1)),
H ′u(p, α)
4
=
∂Hu(p, α)
∂α
= −(c− s)
∫ α
−A
u′α(w0,Π−(p, α, ²)) dF + u(w0,Π−(p, α, α))f(α)
+(cˆ− c)
∫ B
α
u′α(w0,Π+(p, α, ²)) dF − u(w0,Π+(p, α, α))f(α)
= −(c− s)
∫ α
−A
u′α(w0,Π−(p, α, ²)) dF
+(cˆ− c)
∫ B
α
u′α(w0,Π+(p, α, ²)) dF. (2)
For a fixed p, α?u(p) is determined uniquely by the following equation.
H ′u(p, α
?
u(p)) = 0. (3)
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The corresponding optimal order quantity is to order q = a− bp + α?u(p) units
to sell at the unit price p. This thesis investigates how α?(p) would change with
selling price p, therefore, to see how the change in selling price p affects the
optimal order quantity q.
The second partial derivative of Hu(p, α) is as follows.
H ′′u(p, α)
4
=
∂2Hu(p, α)
∂α2
= −(c− s)
[
−(c− s)
∫ α
−A
u′′α(w0,Π−(p, α, ²)) dF + u
′
α(w0,Π(p, α, α))f(α)
]
+(cˆ− c)
[
(cˆ− c)
∫ B
α
u′′α(w0,Π+(p, α, ²)) dF − u′α(w0,Π(p, α, α))f(α)
]
= (c− s)2
∫ α
−A
u′′α(w0,Π−(p, α, ²)) dF + (cˆ− c)2
∫ B
α
u′′α(w0,Π+(p, α, ²)) dF
+(s− cˆ)u′α(w0,Π(p, α, α))f(α)
Due to u′α(w0,Π) > 0, u
′′
α(w0,Π) < 0 for risk aversion and cˆ > s,
H ′′u(p, α) < 0, (4)
for a given p.
Notice from Inequality (4) that Hu(p, α) is concave in α. Thus, α
?
u(p) maximizes
Hu(p, α) for a given p.
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5 The Effect of Change in Selling Price on the
Optimal Order Quantity in the RAPD model
In this section, this thesis examines how selling price p affects the optimal order
quantity q under different risk preferences in the RAPD model.
5.1 Risk-Neutral Newsvendor
Before going to the case where the newsvendor is risk-averse, we consider the
case where the newsvendor is risk neutral. The result might be regarded as a
reference point for further discussion.
For risk-neutral newsvendor, let α?rn(p) be the optimal solution to maximize
Hu(p, α) while p is fixed.
Hu(p, α
?
rn(p)) = maxα Hu(p, α).
Thus, α?rn(p) satisfies the following Equation by Equation (2).
H ′u(p, α
?
rn(p))
= −(c− s)
∫ α?rn(p)
−A
u′α(w0,Π−(p, α
?
rn(p), ²)) dF
+(cˆ− c)
∫ B
α?rn(p)
u′α(w0,Π+(p, α
?
rn(p), ²)) dF
= 0. (5)
For risk neutrality, u′α(w0,Π) = c1 is a constant independent of α. We have the
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following by Equation (5).
−(c− s)
∫ α?rn(p)
−A
c1 dF + (cˆ− c)
∫ B
α?rn(p)
c1 dF = 0
⇒ c1[−(c− s)[F (α?rn(p))− F (−A)] + (cˆ− c)[F (B)− F (α?rn(p))]] = 0
⇒ −(c− s)[F (α?rn(p))− 0] + (cˆ− c)[1− F (α?rn(p))] = 0
⇒ F (α?rn(p)) =
cˆ− c
cˆ− s.
This condition states that the probability of excess capacity is a constant for all
risk-neutral newsvendors. This probability is a simple function of cost parame-
ters and salvage price. In Petruzzi and Dada’s paper (1999), the authors yield
the similar fraction rule for determining α,
F (α?rn(p)) =
p+ cp − c
p+ cp − s.
However, this probability is price-dependent.
We note that α?rn(p) for a risk-neutral newsvendor is independent of the selling
price. From Equation (2) we know the net money cost of initially ordering
one more newspaper when the demand happens to be less than the initial order
quantity is c−s. If the newsvendor initially orders one more newspaper when the
demand is greater than the initial order quantity, she/he will earn an additional
benefit of cˆ− c. Both these two terms are independent of selling price p. Thus,
α?rn(p), is a balance between the cost and the benefit, and is independent of
selling price p. However, we note that the optimal order quantity q = a− bp+
α?rn(p) is decreasing with p while α
?
rn(p) is fixed because it is independent of p.
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5.2 Risk-Averse Newsvendor
Let us now turn back to the case where a risk-averse newsvendor is considered
in the RAPD model.
Lemma 5.1
u′α(w0,Π(p, α, α))

≤ u′α(w0,Π−(p, α, ²˜)), ²˜ ∈ [−A,α],
> u′α(w0,Π+(p, α, ²˜)), ²˜ ∈ (α,B].
Proof. We have the following from the profit equation.
Π(p, α, α)

≥ Π−(p, α, ²˜), ²˜ ∈ [−A,α],
< Π+(p, α, ²˜), ²˜ ∈ (α,B].
When the newsvendor is risk-averse, her/his utility function u(w0,Π) is strictly
concave. u′α(w0,Π) > 0 and u
′′
α(w0,Π) < 0. Thus, u
′
α(w0,Π) is a decreasing
function of wealth. Therefore,
u′α(w0,Π(p, α, α)) ≤ u′α(w0,Π−(p, α, ²˜)), if ²˜ ∈ [−A,α],
u′α(w0,Π(p, α, α)) > u
′
α(w0,Π+(p, α, ²˜)), if ²˜ ∈ (α,B].
This completes the proof.
Theorem 5.2 A risk-averse newsvendor orders less than a risk-neutral one
does for a given selling price p.
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Proof. If we replace u′α(w0,Π−(p, α
?
u(p), ²˜)) and u
′
α(w0,Π+(p, α
?
u(p), ²˜)) with
u′α(w0,Π(p, α
?
u(p), α
?
u(p))) in Equation (3), according to Lemma 5.1, we have
0 = −(c− s)
∫ α?u(p)
−A
u′α(w0,Π−(p, α
?
u(p), ²)) dF
+(cˆ− c)
∫ B
α?u(p)
u′α(w0,Π+(p, α
?
u(p), ²)) dF
< −(c− s)
∫ α?u(p)
−A
u′α [w0,Π(p, α
?
u(p), α
?
u(p))] dF
+(cˆ− c)
∫ B
α?u(p)
u′α [w0,Π(p, α
?
u(p), α
?
u(p))] dF
⇒ u′α [w0,Π(p, α?u(p), α?u(p))]
[
−(c− s)
∫ α?u(p)
−A
dF + (cˆ− c)
∫ B
α?u(p)
dF
]
> 0
⇒ −(c− s)
∫ α?u(p)
−A
dF + (cˆ− c)
∫ B
α?u(p)
dF > 0
⇒ F (α?u(p)) <
cˆ− c
cˆ− s = F (α
?
rn(p))
⇒ α?u(p) < α?rn(p).
Thus, for a given p, a− bp+α?u(p), the order made by a risk-averse newsvendor,
is less than a− bp+ α?rn(p), the order placed by a risk-neutral one.
More generally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3 For a given selling price p, the uniformly more risk-averse the
newsvendor is, the less the newsvendor orders.
Proof. Suppose a utility function v(w0, w) is uniformly more risk-averse than
u(w0, w), we define the optimal order quantity as qv, the optimal choice of α as
α?v(p) for a given p under v(w0, w). qv = a− bp+ α?v(p).
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Pratt (1964) indicates that an increase in risk aversion is equivalent to a concave
transformation of the utility function. Thus, ∃k[u(w0, w)] such that v(w0, w) =
k[u(w0, w)], where k
′
u(w0, w) > 0, k
′′
u(w0, w) < 0. We denote the expected utility
of profit under v(w0, w) as Hv(p, α), and by Equation (2) we obtain
H ′v(p, α)
4
=
∂Hv(p, α)
∂α
= −(c− s)
∫ α
−A
v′α(w0,Π−(p, α, ²)) dF
+(cˆ− c)
∫ B
α
v′α(w0,Π+(p, α, ²)) dF
= −(c− s)
∫ α
−A
k′u(w0,Π−(p, α, ²))u
′
α(w0,Π−(p, α, ²)) dF
+(cˆ− c)
∫ B
α
k′u(w0,Π+(p, α, ²))u
′
α(w0,Π+(p, α, ²)) dF. (6)
Figure 6: Expected Utility Curves under Different Preferences
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For k′′u(w0, w) < 0, we know k
′
u(w0, w) is a decreasing function of wealth. Re-
placing u(w0, w) with k[u(w0, w)] in Equation (6), we obtain
H ′v(p, α
?
u(p))
= −(c− s)
∫ α?u(p)
−A
[k′u(u(w0,Π−(p, α
?
u(p), ²)))
u′α(w0,Π−(p, α
?
u(p), ²))] dF
+(cˆ− c)
∫ B
α?u(p)
[k′u(u(w0,Π+(p, α
?
u(p), ²)))
u′α(w0,Π+(p, α
?
u(p), ²))] dF.
Due to Lemma 5.1,
H ′v(p, α
?
u(p))
< −(c− s)
∫ α?u(p)
−A
k′u [u(w0,Π(p, α
?
u(p), α
?
u(p)))]
u′α(w0,Π−(p, α
?
u(p), ²)) dF
+(cˆ− c)
∫ B
α?u(p)
k′u [u(w0,Π(p, α
?
u(p), α
?
u(p)))]
u′α(w0,Π+(p, α
?
u(p), ²)) dF
= k′u[u(w0,Π(p, α
?
u(p), α
?
u(p)))][
−(c− s)
∫ α?u(p)
−A
u′α(w0,Π−(p, α
?
u(p), ²)) dF
+(cˆ− c)
∫ B
α?u(p)
u′α(w0,Π+(p, α
?
u(p), ²)) dF
]
= 0, (by Equation (3)).
From Inequality (4), we know both Hu(p, α) and Hv(p, α) are concave in α for
a given p. H ′v(p, α
?
v(p)) = 0, while H
′
v(p, α
?
u(p)) = 0, for a given p. Thus, for
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a given p, α?v(p) < α
?
u(p) as described in Figure 6, therefore, α
?
v(p) + a − bp =
qv < q = α
?
u(p) + a− bp for a given p.
If the newsvendor has a utility function which is more risk-averse than v(w0, w),
we can apply another concave transformation to v(w0, w), i.e. g[v(w0, w)] for
g is increasing and concave. We can make the conclusion that the newsvendor
orders less if she/he has more risk aversion for a given p.
Table 4: Optimal Order Quantity under Different Levels of Risk Aversion
Risk aversion Optimal order
r = 0.00016 20
r = 0.00019 18
r = 0.00020 11
r = 0.00210 4
r = 0.00240 0
To see the effect that risk aversion can have on the optimal order quantity, con-
sider the following simple example of a risk-averse newsvendor, whose prefer-
ence satisfies CARA. Such preference can be represented by the utility function
u(w) = −e−rw (r > 0), where r represents the newsvendor’s degree of risk aver-
sion, an increase in r means more risk aversion. Let w0 = 1860, s = 5, c = 20,
cˆ = 30, p = 190, and let ²˜ ∈ {−10, 10}, where the probability of −10 is 0.25 and
the probability of 10 is 0.75. Let a = 105, b = 0.5. Straightforward calculations
yield the optimal newspaper orders for different levels of risk aversion (assuming
newspaper order quantities are around to the nearest integer) in Table 4.
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Note that, for the case where r = 0.0024, the newsvendor is so risk-averse that
she/he does not order even a single newspaper, for fear of losing the cost of 20.
The property of Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion means, for a fixed risk,
decision makers (newsvendors) are willing to pay less to avoid the risk when
they are wealthier. If the newsvendor’s preference exhibits DARA, the above
analysis further implies that wealthier newsvendor (i.e., higher w0) will order
more newspapers, since the higher initial wealth implies lower risk aversion over
the support of the newsvendor’s distribution of final wealth. The optimal order
quantity will fall due to either increased risk aversion or decreased wealth under
DARA, were shown by Baron (1973) for the case where p = cˆ (equivalently, the
case where no second newspaper purchase is possible).
From above, we know that, given risk-averse newsvendor only, we cannot es-
timate the effect of change in selling price p on α?u(p). Therefore, we cannot
estimate the effect of change in selling price p on optimal order quantity q.
5.3 CARA Newsvendor
In this section, this thesis considers a CARA newsvendor.
CARA is presented as utility function u(w) = −e−rw (lemma 3.5), where r
represents the newsvendor’s degree of absolute risk aversion, w is the wealth of
the newsvendor. Note that this utility function also displays Increasing Relative
Risk Aversion (IRRA).
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For CARA newsvendor, let α?ca(p) be the optimal solution of α to maximize
Hu(p, α) while p is fixed.
Hu(p, α
?
ca(p)) = maxα Hu(p, α).
The corresponding optimal order quantity is q?ca(p) = a− bp+ α?ca(p).
For simplicity, this thesis hereafter considers that the demand, D˜(p, ²˜) = a −
bp+ ²˜ (a > 0, b > 0), is a Bernoulli Distribution only, where ²˜ follows Bernoulli
Distribution, corresponding to high demand and low demand. P (²˜ = −A) = pb,
P (²˜ = B) = 1− pb.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4 A newsvendor has CARA, i.e. her/his utility function is u(w) =
−e−rw, where r > 0, w is the wealth. The demand is defined as D˜(p, ²˜) =
a− bp+ ²˜ (a > 0, b > 0), where ²˜ is a random variable and it follows Bernoulli
Distribution. Then, the optimal order quantity q?ca(p) is decreasing with the
selling price p.
Proof. ²˜ follows Bernoulli Distribution. Then, by Equation (1) we obtain
Hu(p, α)
= pb
[
−e− r(w0,Π−(p, α,−A))
]
+ (1− pb)
[
−e− r(w0,Π+(p, α,B))
]
.
The optimal value α?ca(p) satisfies the first-order condition of Hu(p, α) is zero.
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Consider the first partial derivative of Hu(p, α) taken with respect to α, we
obtain
pbr (−c+ s) e− r (w0 + (p− c) (a− bp)− (p− s)A− (c− s)α
?
ca(p))
+ (1− pb) r (cˆ− c) e− r (w0 + (p− c) (a− bp) + (p− cˆ)B + (cˆ− c)α
?
ca(p))
= 0
⇒ α?ca(p) = −
(A+B)p
cˆ− s + Φ1
⇒ dα
?
ca(p)
dp
= −A+B
cˆ− s < 0,
where Φ1 =
As+Bcˆ
cˆ− s −
1
r (cˆ− s) ln
(
pb (c− s)
(cˆ− c) (1− pb)
)
.
It follows that the optimal value α?ca(p) is a decreasing function of p. Therefore,
q?ca(p1) < q
?
ca(p2) if p1 > p2.
5.4 CRRA Newsvendor
In this section, this thesis considers CRRA newsvendor.
CRRA is presented as u(w) = ln(w) or u(w) =
1
1− rw
1−r (0 < r < 1 or 1 < r)
(lemma 3.4), where r represents the newsvendor’s degree of relative risk aversion,
w is the wealth of the newsvendor. Note that the above three utility functions
also display Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA).
Arrow (1965) declares two conclusions:
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1. It is broadly permissible to assume that relative risk aversion increases
with wealth, though theory does not exclude some fluctuations.
2. If, for simplicity, we wish to assume a constant relative risk aversion, then
the appropriate value is 1.
According to the point 2 in Arrow’s declaration, this thesis only considers the
CRRA newsvendor’s utility function u(w) = ln(w). Let α?cr(p) be the optimal
solution of α to maximize Hu(p, α) while p is fixed.
Hu(p, α
?
cr(p)) = maxα Hu(p, α).
The corresponding optimal order quantity is q?cr(p) = a− bp+ α?cr(p).
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.5 A newsvendor has CRRA, i.e. her/his utility function is u(w) =
ln(w), where w is the wealth. The demand is defined as D˜(p, ²˜) = a−bp+ ²˜ (a >
0, b > 0), where ²˜ is a random variable and it follows Bernoulli Distribution.
(i) If pb ∈ [0, p0b) and p > 0, when p increases, the optimal order quantity q?cr(p)
increases first and then decreases;
(ii) if pb ∈ [p0b ,Ω) and p > 0, when p increases, the optimal order quantity q?cr(p)
decreases;
(iii) if pb = Ω and p > 0, when p increases, the optimal order quantity q
?
cr(p)
decreases;
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(iv) if pb ∈ (Ω, 1] and p > 0, when p increases, the optimal order quantity q?cr(p)
decreases first and then increases;
where p0b =
[A− (a+ bc)] (cˆ− c)
A(cˆ− c)−B(c− s)− (a+ bc)(cˆ− s) , Ω =
cˆ− c
cˆ− s (It will be proved
later that p0b < Ω in Lemma 5.6).
Proof. ²˜ follows the Bernoulli Distribution. Then, by Equation (1) we obtain
Hu(p, α)
= pb ln (w0 + (p− c) (a− bp)− (p− s)A− (c− s)α)
+ (1− pb) ln (w0 + (p− c) (a− bp) + (p− cˆ)B + (cˆ− c)α) .
The optimal value α?cr(p) satisfies the first-order condition of Hu(p, α) is zero.
Consider the first partial derivative of Hu(p, α) taken with respect to α, we
obtain
pb (−c+ s)
w0 + (p− c) (a− bp)− (p− s)A− (c− s)α?cr(p)
+
(1− pb) (cˆ− c)
w0 + (p− c) (a− bp) + (p− cˆ)B + (cˆ− c)α?cr(p)
= 0
⇒ α?cr(p) = x1p2 + y1p+ z1,
where x1 =
b [pb(cˆ− s)− (cˆ− c)]
(cˆ− c)(c− s) ,
y1 =
− (a+ bc)[pb(cˆ− s)− (cˆ− c)]− A(cˆ− c)(1− pb)−Bpb(c− s)
(cˆ− c)(c− s) ,
z1 =
(ac− w0)[pb(cˆ− s)− (cˆ− c)] + As(cˆ− c)(1− pb) +Bpbcˆ(c− s)
(cˆ− c)(c− s) .
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(i) If pb ∈ [0, p0b), it follows that x1 < 0 and y1 > 0. Further it turns out
that α?cr(p) increases with p when 0 ≤ p ≤ −
y1
2x1
and then decreases when
p > − y1
2x1
. Therefore, the optimal order quantity q?cr(p) increases with p when
0 ≤ p ≤ max{0,−y1 − b
2x1
} and then decreases when p > max{0,−y1 − b
2x1
}.
(ii) If pb ∈ [p0b ,Ω), it follows that x1 < 0 and y1 < 0. Further it turns out that
α?cr(p) decreases with p when p > 0. Therefore, q
?
cr(p) decreases with p when
p > 0.
(iii) If pb = Ω, it follows that x1 = 0, y1 = −A+Bcˆ− s < 0. Further it turns
out that α?cr(p) is a decreasing function of p when p > 0. Therefore, q
?
cr(p) is a
decreasing function of p when p > 0.
(iv) If pb ∈ (Ω, 1], it follows that x1 > 0 and y1 < 0. Further it turns out that
α?cr(p) decreases with p when 0 ≤ p ≤ −
y1
2x1
and then increases when p > − y1
2x1
.
Therefore, the optimal order quantity q?cr(p) decreases with p when 0 ≤ p ≤
max{0,−y1 − b
2x1
} and, q?cr(p) increases with p when p > max{0,−
y1 − b
2x1
}.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.6 p0b < Ω if A < a+ bc.
Proof. From above we know that y1 =
[A(cˆ− c)−B(c− s)− (a+ bc)(cˆ− s)] pb + [(a+ bc)− A] (cˆ− c)
(cˆ− c)(c− s) is a lin-
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ear function of pb. If pb > Ω, y1 < 0. If pb = Ω, y1 < 0. If 0 ≤ pb < Ω, y1 > 0
because A ≤ a− bp < a+ bc. Thus, y1 is a decreasing function of pb if pb > 0.
y1(p
0
b) = 0, therefore, 0 < p
0
b < Ω if A < a+ bc.
We give a numeric example for illustration. Let w0 = 1860, s = 5, c = 20,
cˆ = 30, a = 105, b = 0.5. We further assume ²˜ ∈ {−10, 10}, which means A =
B = 10. It follows that p0b =
14
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and Ω = 0.4. (i) when pb = 0.3 < p
0
b . It turns
out that α?cr(p) = −0.0083p2+1.1500p+7.3333, q?cr(p) = −0.0083p2+0.6500p+
112.3333. Therefore, when 0 < p < 39.0, q?cr increases with p. When p > 39.0,
q?cr decreases with p. (ii) when pb = 0.38. It turns out that α
?
cr(p) = −0.0017p2−
0.4100p + 12.6667, q?cr(p) = −0.0017p2 − 0.9100p + 117.6667. Therefore, when
0 < p, q?cr decreases with p. (iii) when pb = 0.4. It turns out that α
?
cr(p) =
−0.8p+ 14, q?cr(p) = −1.3p+ 119. Therefore, when 0 < p, q?cr decreases with p.
(iv) when pb = 0.5. It turns out that α
?
cr(p) = 0.02083p
2− 5.67500p+30.66667,
q?cr(p) = 0.02083p
2− 6.17500p+135.66667. Therefore, when 0 < p < 148.20, q?cr
decreases with p. When p > 148.20, q?cr increases with p.
From the above theorem we know that the optimal order quantity decreases
with the selling price in case (ii) and (iii). In case (i) and (iv) the optimal or-
der quantity decreases with the selling price partially. Economists have already
explained the reason. i.e. higher prices lead to lower demand. Notice that both
in case (i) and (iv) that the optimal order quantity is also increasing with the
selling price partially. This thesis explains it in the following two aspects, refer-
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ring to Qing Li and Hongtao Zhang’s working paper. For one explanation, we
can easily say that this phenomenon occurs due to the randomness of demand.
Therefore, when q goes up, it is possible, and sometimes even optimal as in the
theorem 5.5, to sell more at a higher margin. For the other explanation, we
define α = q − (a − bp) before and think of it as the portion of inventory set
aside to guard against uncertainty. Petruzzi and Dada (1999) point out that this
α plays the role of safety stock factor. When demand is uncertain, for a given
price, the decision maker (newsvendor) will be better off with a higher α as there
is a possibility of selling more by reducing shortages. Considering the identity
q = (a − bp) + α, there are two possible responses to an increase in the initial
order quantity. On the one hand, a higher order can be used to meet a greater
average demand. That is to say, when q increases, (a − bp) can be increased
by decreasing p. On the other hand, a higher order can be used to reduce the
expected shortage by increasing the safety stock factor α. That is to say, when
q increases, α can be increased. We know from the newsvendor problem that a
higher safety stock factor corresponds to a higher marginal shortage cost. Since
here the marginal shortage cost equals p− c, the decision maker (newsvendor)
should set a higher p to have a correspondly higher marginal shortage cost when
α is greater.
6 Conclusion
We have looked at the effect of change in selling price on optimal order
quantity under different risk preferences for this extension of the classic
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Table 5: Summary Comparative Statics Results as p Increases in the RAPD
model
Utility Assumptions Change in Order Distribution
risk neutrality decrease –
risk aversion indeterminate –
CARA decrease Bernoulli Distribution
i. increase first and then decrease
CRRA ii. decrease Bernoulli Distribution
iii. decrease first and then increase
Table 6: Results as p Increases under Special DARA and IRRA Utility Functions
in the RAPD model
Utility Assumptions Change in Order Distribution
IRRA decrease Bernoulli Distribution
i. increase first and then decrease
DARA ii. decrease Bernoulli Distribution
iii. decrease first and then increase
newsvendor problem. Except that the effect of selling price on optimal or-
der quantity remains indeterminate for risk-averse decision maker (newsven-
dor), we can see selling price greatly affect the optimal order quantity in
other cases. (i) In the case where the decision maker (newsvendor) is
risk-neutral, increasing selling price leads to decreasing optimal order quan-
tity; (ii) In the case where the decision maker (newsvendor) has CARA, in-
creasing selling price leads to decreasing optimal order quantity; and (iii)
In the case where the decision maker (newsvendor) has CRRA, the results
are more complex. If the probability of low demand is in the range of[
0,
[A− (a+ bc)] (cˆ− c)
A(cˆ− c)−B(c− s)− (a+ bc)(cˆ− s)
)
, when selling price increases, the op-
timal order quantity increases first and then decreases. If the probability of low
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Table 7: Summary Comparative Statics Results as p Increases in the EGS Model
Utility Assumptions Change in Order
risk neutrality no change
risk aversion indeterminate
CARA decrease
DARA indeterminate
demand is in the range of
[
[A− (a+ bc)] (cˆ− c)
A(cˆ− c)−B(c− s)− (a+ bc)(cˆ− s) ,
cˆ− c
cˆ− s
]
, opti-
mal order quantity decreases with selling price. If the probability of low demand
is greater than
cˆ− c
cˆ− s , when selling price increases, optimal order quantity de-
creases first and then increases. A summary of the results is shown in Table
5. This thesis also examines some special utility functions of DARA and IRRA
at the same time. The results are similar and described in Table 6. All these
results are different from those obtained in the EGS Model, which are shown in
Table 7.
This extension of the classic newsvendor problem provides an excellent frame-
work for examining how the inventory problem interacting with the marketing
issue (selling price) will influence the decision maker at the firm level. The own-
ers of some firms, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, are usually
the managers as well, whose decisions greatly affect the fate of the firms. This
thesis investigates the behavior of the firms by examining the behavior of the
decision makers.
This extension of the classic newsvendor problem is closer to reality than before.
It also provides an integrated framework for investigating different newsvendor
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problems. Thus, it might motivate and encourage more applications of the
newsvendor problem which is a foundation of many inventory problems.
This thesis can be improved in the following aspects. First, this study has not
determined p and α to maximize Hu(p, α) for simplicity. It might be worthy
of further study to determine them in the RAPD model. Second, this thesis
has discussed the randomness of demand follows the Bernoulli Distribution. To
examine the RAPD model more accurately, suppose the randomness of demand
follows the other distributions, such as normal distribution, is worthy of further
study.
In addition to any benefits and costs, the risk-averse newsvendor also reacts
to wealth effects for changes in prices, costs and risk. It thus becomes more
difficult to determine the qualitative effects of changes in these parameters for
the risk-averse newsvendor than for the risk-neutral newsvendor. Static models
can only capture a part of reality. How risk aversion works in a more realistic
dynamic setting is worthy of future examination. The analysis could be helpful
in examining a dynamic model. Given the prominence of the static newsvendor
problem in the literature, the RAPD model is useful in its own right as well.
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Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 3.1
(i) Let u be concave. Then by definition of concavity u(αx + (1 − α)y) ≥
αu(x) + (1− α)u(y) for all x, y ∈ R and α ∈ [0, 1]. But E(w) = αx+ (1− α)y
and E(u(w)) = αu(x) + (1 − α)u(y). Thus, this inequality implies u(E(w)) ≥
E(u(w)). As by definition E(u(w)) = u(Cu(w)), then u(E(w)) ≥ u(Cu(w)). As
u is monotonically increasing, then E(w) ≥ Cu(w), which is the definition of
risk-aversion. (ii) and (iii) follow analogously.
B Proof of Theorem 3.2
We shall go (i)⇒ (ii)⇒ (iii)⇒ (i).
(i) ⇒ (ii): First we must establish that T exists. Let v(x) = t. As v is
monotonic and continuous, then the inverse v−1 exists and so v−1(t) = x. Thus,
u(x) = u(v−1(t)). Let us define T = uv−1, then u(x) = T (t). But recall
that t = v(x), thus u(x) = T (v(x)). Thus T exists. Now, differentiating
u′(x) = T ′(v(x))v′(x). Thus:
u′(x)
v′(x)
= T ′(v(x)) > 0,
as u′(x), v′(x) > 0 by assumption of monotonicity. Differentiating again:
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u′′(x) = T ′′(v(x))v′(x)2 + T ′(v(x))v′′(x),
or substituting in for T ′(v(x)):
u′′(x) = T ′′(v(x))v′(x)2 +
u′(x)v′′(x)
v′(x)
.
Thus dividing through by u′(x) and rearranging:
v′′(x)
v′(x)
− u
′′(x)
u′(x)
= −T
′′(v(x))v′(x)2
u′(x)
.
Now, by assumption v′ > 0 and u′ > 0, thus let
v′(x)2
u′(x)
= α > 0 so:
v′′(x)
v′(x)
− u
′′(x)
u′(x)
= −T ′′(v(x))α. (7)
But by (i),
v′′(x)
v′(x)
−u
′′(x)
u′(x)
≥ 0. Thus, as α > 0, then it must be that−T ′′(v(x)) ≥
0, or simply, T ′′(v(x)) ≤ 0. Thus, for all x ∈ R, T ′ ≥ 0 and T ′′ ≤ 0, thus T is
concave. Q.E.D.
(ii)⇒ (iii): Recall that u(Cu(w)) = E(u(w)). Thus, by (ii), as u(x) = T (v(x)),
then u(Cu(w)) = E(T (v(w))). As T is concave, then by Jensen’s inequality:
E(T (v(w))) ≤ T (E(v(w))),
but as E(T (v(w))) = u(Cu(w)) and E(v(w)) = v(Cv(w)) by definition, then
this implies:
u(Cu(w)) ≤ T (v(Cv(w))),
or, by (ii), as u(·) = T (v(·)), this becomes u(Cu(w)) ≤ u(Cv(w)). Thus by
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monotonicity of u, Cu(w)) ≤ Cv(w) which implies, by definition, that piu(w) ≥
piv(w) which is (iii). Q.E.D.
(iii) ⇒ (i): Let us show, equivalently, that “not (i)” ⇒ “not (iii)”. Thus, if
“not (i)”, then:
−u
′′(x¯)
u′(x¯)
< −v
′′(x¯)
v′(x¯)
for some x¯ ∈ R.
By continuity, there is a neighborhood N²(x¯) for which this is true. Let z be a
random variable which takes values only in N²(x¯), and elsewhere zero. Recall
that in our earlier proof of (i) ⇒ (ii), we obtained Equation (7). For z ∈ N²(x¯),
−u
′′(z)
u′(z)
< −v
′′(z)
v′(z)
, thus, −T ′′[v(z)]α < 0 for z ∈ N²(x¯), thus T ′′ > 0, and thus
T (·) is convex. But, by earlier theorem (ii) ⇒ (iii), we can see that T ′′ > 0
implies that piv(w) > piu(w), i.e. “not (iii)”. Thus, “not (i)” ⇒ “not (iii)” or,
equivalently, (iii) ⇒ (i). Q.E.D.
Thus, (i)⇒ (ii)⇒ (iii)⇒ (i).
C Proof of Theorem 3.3
Let va(w) = u(w + a) and the rest follows by the theorem 3.2. Note that
d(−u
′′(w)
u′(w)
)
dw
< 0.
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D Proof of Lemma 3.4
As we all know, if the utility function u(w) has CRRA, then
ru(w) = −u
′′(w)
u′(w)
=
R
w
, (8)
Ru(w) = −wu
′′(w)
u′(w)
= R, (9)
where R is the coefficient of CRRA. For risk-aversion, Equation (8) > 0, so
R > 0.
Let y(w) = u′(w), and substitute y(w) into Equation (9), we obtain
−wy
′(w)
y(w)
= R,
⇒ dy
y
= −Rdw
w
.
Integral on both sides, we obtain
ln|y| = −Rlnw + c3,
⇒ ln|y| = ln(w−Rec3),
⇒ y = ±ec3w−R,
where c3 is a constant which is in (−∞,+∞).
As we know, u(w) has risk-aversion, so y = u′(w) > 0, thus
y(w) = u′(w) = ec3w−R = c2w−R, (10)
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where c2 > 0.
By Equation (10) we have
du(w)
dw
= c2w
−R,
⇒ u(w) =

c1
1−Rw
1−R, 0 < R < 1, 1 < R,
c2ln(w), R = 1,
where c1, c2 > 0.
E Proof of Lemma 3.5
As we all know, if the utility function u(w) has CARA, then
ru(w) = −u
′′(w)
u′(w)
= r, (11)
where r > 0 for risk-aversion.
Let y(w) = u′(w), and substitute y(w) into Equation (11), we obtain
−y
′(w)
y(w)
= r,
⇒ dy
y
= −rdw.
Integral on both sides, we obtain
ln|y| = −rw + c2,
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⇒ y = ±e−rw+c2 ,
where r > 0, c2 ∈ (−∞,+∞).
As we know, u(w) has risk-aversion, u(w) must be concave, so y(w) = u′(w) > 0,
thus
y(w) = u′(w) = ec2e−rw. (12)
By Equation (12), we have
du
dw
= ec2e−rw,
⇒ u(w) = −c1e−rw,
where r > 0, c1 > 0.
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